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Introduction
Several reports on reforming the international financial architecture have been, are being,
and will be produced by multilateral organizations, think tanks, freethinkers, and G-n task
forces, with n taking values between 7 and 33.
1  The question is whether any of the
initiatives will solve the important problems in international financial markets and be
implemented before a temporary cease-fire on the financial battlefield is misinterpreted
as the end of the war.
This paper provides an overview and assessment of reform initiatives, both those
currently on the table and those that are not but we think should be.  The intent is to
clarify the logic behind these proposals and assess them from a Latin American
perspective.  Our discussion is based on the extent to which reform initiatives alleviate
the problems we identified in the companion paper “What’s Wrong with International
Financial Markets,” (Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 1999).  The overall conclusion is
that the current approach to reforming the international financial architecture is not
appropriate for the task and a paradigm shift is required.
An initiative may obtain a bad grade for many reasons.  First, it may have only a
negligible impact on the workings of the international financial architecture, i.e., it fails
to address a substantial problem.  Second, it may have a significant impact on financial
markets but narrowly fit the interests of capital-exporting countries, as opposed to the
needs of emerging markets.  In both cases, proposed reforms would miss a historical
opportunity to shape international financial institutions to support economic
development.  Finally, and most importantly, proposals may be counterproductive from a
developmental perspective.
We are concerned with the possibility that an initiative may have a negative
developmental impact because nearly all of the proposals currently under active
consideration or experimentation entail smaller capital flows to support development in
emerging markets.  This outcome comes as a result of fighting moral hazard or as an
expedient to reduce financial instability.  In terms of the clusters of distortions identified
in our companion paper (Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 1999), we are concerned that
some alleviation of the distortions underlying the Theories of Too Much may severely
aggravate the distortions behind the Theories of Too Little or Theories of Too Volatile.
There is a good chance that our reservations regarding the initiatives currently
being advanced in international fora owe more to our Latin American perspective than to
purely technical differences in assessment.  Our assessment is based on the efficiency of
                                               
1 Eichengreen (1999) provides an interesting survey of the main proposals on the table, and The Economist,
(1999) gives a very useful summary discussion on the topic. To name some of the initiatives on the table:
Bergsten (1998),  Bergsten and  Hennig (1996),  Calomiris (1998), Camdessus (1998), Edwards (1998),
Fischer 1999), Garten (1998), Government of France (1998), Government of the United States (1999), G-7
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(1998), Meltzer (1998), Naciones Unidas (1999), Raffer (1990), Rogoff (1999), Sachs (1998), Soros (1997,
1998), Stiglitz (1998).4
the proposed reforms: the deeper financial integration goes, supporting high returns in
capital-scarce emerging markets, the better.  It is clear, however, that an efficient
architecture entails financial support from developed countries from time to time when
things go wrong.  From this alternative perspective, it would make sense to prefer
reforms that limit financial risks, even at the cost of efficiency.  The current bias in favor
of reforms that limit capital flows may be better interpreted in this way rather than on
efficiency grounds.
In this paper, we analyze the degree to which the initiatives effectively address the
distortions in each of the three clusters of theories.  In the case of conflicting effects
across this three-way typology, we refine the ambiguous assessment that would follow by
weighing the tradeoffs involved.  This evaluation methodology demands the
consideration of the relative importance of each type of distortion for the problem at
hand, for which we use the conclusions of the companion paper mentioned above.
A key advantage of this joint analysis across distortions is that it makes explicit
what economists refer to as the second-best theorem: the elimination of any one specific
distortion may fail to improve welfare in the presence of remaining distortions.  In fact,
the single most important problem with the way the debate on reforming international
financial architecture is being conducted is its partial, even unilateral, approach to
problems.  But we must remember that reducing any identified distortion is not
necessarily good policy and that successfully alleviating a specific undesirable symptom
is not necessarily the manifestation of a welfare improvement. This is always the case
when there are multiple distortions.
For example, the objective of reducing the moral hazard induced by official
guarantees to international private capital flows would be served by curtailing official
financial support to countries in distress.  However, such financial support would be
extremely beneficial in the event of a liquidity crisis and financial contagion.  The
overemphasis on moral hazard would lead to counterproductive policies if the latter
distortions are preponderant.  Similarly, reducing the incidence of crises by impeding
capital flows to a sufficient extent may be a counterproductive policy once the deleterious
growth effects of lower capital integration are factored in.
In this paper, we concentrate on a number of core initiatives that characterize the
main angles of the debate.  We omit other initiatives not because they are without use or
importance, but because they are either uncontroversial or propose changes that are more
decorative than foundational, i.e., they take too many walls and windows for granted.
For example, we do not discuss standards on transparency because we see them as
uncontroversial but also of limited impact.
For each core initiative examined in this paper, whether currently on the table or
proposed for consideration, we first identify which of the main distortions, identified in
the companion paper, it addresses.  This correspondence between initiative and distortion
provides a clear relationship between the problems diagnosed and the solutions reviewed.5
We then assess the initiatives by weighing the benefit concerning the distortion they are
designed to alleviate and the possibly unintended effects concerning other distortions.
2
We group the initiatives examined in this paper into three sets and review them in
turn.  The first two sets of initiatives involve the provision of financial support triggered
after an emergency arises.  First, we consider initiatives concerning the unilateral
provision of financial support by the official sector.  Second, we consider initiatives in
which the private sector is also given a role in providing financial support. Finally, the
third set of initiatives refers to reforms to the financial institutional framework in which
international capital flows to emerging markets take place.  They encompass standards
and regulations applicable to financial systems, both national and international, as well as
monetary and currency arrangements in emerging markets.
Official Financial Support
The main idea behind initiatives concerning official financial support is the need for the
function of lending of last resort at the international level.  The clearest case for such an
initiative is that in which crises in emerging markets result from a sudden lack of
liquidity, i.e., liquidity crises.  Liquidity crises are usually addressed through the
provision of last-resort lending.  In fact, simply the existence of such a lender may be
sufficient to prevent destructive runs and panics.  The basic argument for international
versions of a lender of last resort is the same argument used in a domestic context: by
promising in advance to provide financial support in case of unexpected need in which
fundamentals are right or will be right, (liquidity) crises are prevented.  In fact, financial
panic rationalized by the damage in fundamentals that a massive financial withdrawal (a
“run”) would generate cannot exist when there is a commitment of ample support that
would avoid such damage.
We have argued in Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (1999) that liquidity crises
have been prevalent in recent crisis episodes, which would explain the unpredictability of
the collapse in fundamentals, a key problem to address in the future.  From this point of
view, a central problem in the world may be that the globalization of financial flows in
the context of original sin (i.e., the inability to borrow long term in a country’s own
currency) has overwhelmed the capacity of national central banks in emerging countries
to credibly provide enough last-resort lending to prevent liquidity crises. Therefore, to us
international lending of last resort suggests itself.
What are the effects of this initiative on other distortions?  Successful lending of
last resort reduces private default risk, but this is not necessarily a source of moral
hazard.  This is a legitimate reduction in risk obtained from removing an inefficient risk
factor, i.e., the panic equilibrium. This does not open a gap between social and private
risks.  In fact, lower expected risks will give rise to more capital flows that will be
applied efficiently.  Therefore, this initiative in the context of liquidity crises would be
good all around.
                                               
2 We also compare initiatives that are mutually incompatible.6
If, on the contrary, a lending of last resort facility is available to insolvent
countries, i.e., countries unable to pay even after all liquidity constraints are removed,
then the crisis will not be avoided and the facility may incur losses.  Moreover, critics
who argue that the recent financial turmoil is not associated with liquidity crises think
that the provision of last-resort lending would only serve to bail out private creditors,
exacerbating moral hazard problems and thereby aggravating rather than resolving the
situation.
It is worth keeping in mind this distinction between liquidity and solvency crises,
which is key for the evaluation of this and other initiatives (for a formal analytical
framework see Fernández-Arias 1995).  We begin by analyzing the liquidity crisis case,
which is the central case in our diagnosis, and then discuss the solvency crisis case.
Lending of Last Resort
Lending of last resort would be perfect in liquidity crises.  The challenge then is
to recreate the function of lending of last resort at an international level in the real world.
The obvious move is to create a global lender of last resort or, more specifically, to
reform the IMF so that it could better play this role.  Making the IMF a global lender of
last resort is an idea that was originally discussed at the time of the Bretton Woods
conference in 1944.  In spite of the eloquence of John Maynard Keynes, the American
representatives were not willing to provide the institution with the ability to print money.
After all, the world was adopting a dollar standard and the United States was not about to
renounce sovereignty over the management of its own currency.
Since then the political-economy problems of providing a global lender of last resort
have been insurmountable, but for other reasons.  First, there is reticence to create a
powerful global institution that may not be fully accountable.  Second, there is the fear
that taxpayers in industrial countries would be asked to pay for bailouts in emerging
countries.  These fears could probably be addressed through the right governance
structure and the use of collateral to protect taxpayers from undue risk, although in the
international context collateral always remains limited by sovereign risk.  The idea has
gained the support of Stanley Fischer (1999), the second in command at the IMF.
However, as The Economist (1999) concluded in its recent review of global architectural
initiatives, there is very little support for anything this ambitious at the global level. But
we must remember that appetites may change as the costs of the alternatives become
more obvious.
A second-best option is to mimic last-resort lending by using extant institutions.
In the absence of a global lender of last resort, the IMF and other International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) face a daunting task in dealing with potential liquidity crises.
3  Current
rescue packages may not be adequate because, unlike last-resort lending, they are not
committed ex ante but are negotiated after a crisis has occurred.  In fact, to a large extent
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the debate has moved towards crisis prevention and lending of last resort because of the
dissatisfaction with crisis resolution through rescue packages tried in recent crises.  It is
useful to recapitulate the reasons why rescue packages had problems in order to discuss
the advantages of an alternative facility closer to the idea of last resort lending.
It is key to have financial support available before a crisis.  Once a financial crisis
erupts, experience shows that it quickly develops into a meltdown with enormous output
losses.  Reasons for this may reside in the incomplete financial markets and hard-to-
enforce contracts in developing countries (see Calvo and Fernández-Arias 1998).  For
example, inadequate bankruptcy laws can lead to socially costly disruptions when activity
is suspended until property rights are re-established.  These distortions are intensified by
the breakdown of “implicit” contracts across firms (inter-firm credit and supply/demand
relations when there is asset specificity) and between employer and employees at times of
crises.
Interestingly, this diagnosis implies that a financial crisis sets off a chain of
destructive events that would not be undone if financing returned to its original level.
Hence, even though the provision of emergency support would be beneficial, it would not
restore the unbroken network of relations that the market requires.  This pessimistic
outlook may help explain the relative failure of the rescue packages for most of the crisis
countries in recent years.  Although these packages generally were very large, coming
close to offsetting in size the initial negative financial shocks, they did not come close to
erasing the devastating real impacts.
Part of the problem may be caused by the fact that support is  tranched and
conditioned on the achievement of some future changes. This makes support contingent
on actions that investors may consider uncertain. This may explain why in the case of
Mexico the ample commitment to provide liquidity did not in itself stop the run. In fact
the support was fully disbursed and the private sector withdrew, thereby disrupting the
specificity involved in credit relations and in private information.
This failure calls into question the traditional rescue package strategy. Experience
with recent crises, from Mexico to East Asia, suggests that this strategy is insufficient to
avoid enormous damage to the wellbeing of the countries involved or to prevent the
contagion from spreading internationally.
 The following principles for an alternative strategy mimic the classical principles
of lending of last resort (Bagehot 1873) in an international context within the institutional
constraints (for details, see Fernández-Arias, Gavin, and Hausmann 1998).  The first and
governing principle is to strengthen mechanisms designed to prevent a liquidity crisis or
lack of financing.  To work, these programs must be applied only when the economic
fundamentals are sufficiently sound for there to be reasonable expectation that market
confidence and access can be restored and held.  This will also require that financial
support be of sufficient critical mass to dampen or forestall a liquidity crunch capable of
triggering a crisis.8
Second, there must be certainty that the support provided—whether a guarantee, a
loan, or a line of credit—will be available immediately when funds are needed.
Otherwise the prevention capability of the facility is diluted.  Access should be
automatic, either on demand or on the basis of immediately verifiable criteria.
Consequently, the  conditionality applied in such operations must not impede timely
disbursements, and disbursement conditions must be replaced by conditions of approval.
 Third, these “conditions of approval” mean that support should be offered
selectively to countries able to meet a series of preconditions.  Importantly, this
selectivity would translate into positive incentives for policy, an extra benefit of such a
facility.  Their economic fundamentals and their economic policy commitments must be
compatible with warding off a crisis and conform to prudential standards and efforts to
reduce financial vulnerability.  Regular review by the IMF will be needed to ensure
compliance over time.  If conditions are not met, a delayed exit mechanism must be
implemented in order to ensure that it does not trigger a crisis. Such an exit strategy may
involve the negotiation of a traditional support program such as a stand-by program or
and Extended Financing Facility (EFF).
Fourth, IFI support will be more effective if it is supplementary to market
mechanisms and can be leveraged through the private sector.  In other words, this
initiative is designed to  bail in the private sector.
4  To do so, official international
cooperation is essential for achieving the necessary critical mass.
Finally, disbursed loans, including guarantees that have been called, should be
relatively short-term and repayable early without penalty.  They should carry sufficiently
high interest rates to ensure they will be drawn upon only when there is a financing
shortfall.  On the other hand, the loans’ commitment fee, whether a guarantee or a line of
credit, should be priced to reflect the financial cost of such commitment since low fees
would provide further incentives not to draw down the loan unless a real need exists.
These facilities should be designed as prudential planning tools: abstention from
disbursement would be normal and should not be discouraged through artificially high
commitment fees.
For concreteness, it is useful to compare the facility we just outlined with the
contingent credit line (CCL) facility recently approved by the  IMF, which Mr.
Camdessus has described as a Copernican revolution in the Fund because it inverts the
model from after-crisis support to crisis prevention.  In this facility, countries pursuing
sound policy that also meet a number of financial and reporting standards would enjoy
financial support in the form of a credit line that can be drawn on if they fall victim to
panic or contagion.  As in our proposal, CCL can be seen as a variant or substitute for a
lender of last resort for countries in which good collateral (which is difficult for a
sovereign to produce) is replaced by the requirement of a healthy economy.
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involvement is discussed at length in the following section.9
A key problema with the Fund version of the CCL facility, however, is that from
the point of view of a country, the committed support is not certain and its delivery may
take time; either of these qualities may render the mechanism ineffective against panic.
This is because delivery is mostly not automatic at the country’s choice but requires final
approval depending on the Fund’s assessment of the situation. There are also problems
related to the transition into the new Copernican world as the current rules make
ineligible those countries with active traditional programs such as stand-by agreements
with the Fund. We favor setting country eligibility criteria on the basis of preconditions
and allowing automatic withdrawal.
Another important difference is that in the Fund’s CCL there is no involvement of
the private sector, while in our proposal the private sector would cofinance.  The absence
of the private sector means smaller resources and, perhaps more importantly, less
accountability.  In fact, cofinancing with the private sector introduces market discipline
through eligibility and pricing to ensure that the facility does not become a subsidy in
disguise.  (Broader implications of private sector involvement are discussed in the next
section.)
Finally, it is important to implement this facility in a way that eligible countries
are regarded as the strongest of the pack, rather than those seeking potential help for
some good reason unknown to the market.  Otherwise, even an objectively good facility
may be in low demand, a problem reminiscent of the Groucho Marx joke about not
wanting to belong to a club that would not have you as a member.  Whether expectations
are positive or negative depends to a large extent on the rules of the eligibility game.   For
example, if countries need to apply individually and run the risk of not being accepted
expeditiously, interest will tend to be low.  If, on the contrary, IMF produced a list of
eligible countries and allowed them to join en masse (e.g., automatically extending the
facility privilege as a matter of course), chances are that belonging to the club will be
regarded as a prize.
The analysis would not be complete if we did not consider the case of solvency
crises.  Contrary to a liquidity crisis, in this case the solution does not involve only the
provision of finance.  In this case, reforms to strengthen fundamentals, including
conditionality, are essential. In the absence of these changes, additional financial support
would not re-establish confidence and would postpone needed reforms and deepen the
inevitable crisis, diluting the market discipline that would otherwise be exerted when
fundamentals turn riskier. Furthermore, it is important to consider the involvement of the
private sector in order to arrive at an efficient plan of financial support; otherwise official
support may end up being a bailout of private creditors with little benefit to the country.
The anticipation of such a bailout would in turn create moral hazard.  So it is clear that a
lender of last resort is not the best answer and a different approach to official support
ought to be applied.
5   We discuss mechanisms to deal with this more traditional type of
                                               
5  Still, many of the lessons derived from recent experiences with liquidity crises are applicable.  In
particular, it would be desirable for a new generation of financial rescue programs to be put in place that
would be activated before crises erupt.  Contrary to liquidity problems, presumably, fundamental solvency10
crisis in the following section, after reviewing the role of the private sector.  Here, it is
important to discuss whether the risk of applying last resort lending to solvency crises is
so large as to make this initiative undesirable to deal with liquidity crises.
There are three main reasons why the initiative for official lending of last resort to
prevent liquidity crises as outlined above is robust to the risk of application to situations
of insolvency.  First, our diagnosis indicates that in this era liquidity crises are prevalent
and, therefore, the risk of wrong application is small.  Therefore the extent of moral
hazard generated by this facility is small and benefits would exceed costs.  Second, there
are ways to discriminate liquidity and solvency crises in order to reduce the risk of wrong
application: the better the fundamentals before the crisis, the more likely it is that the
crisis is of liquidity.  Eligibility conditions to qualify for the facility based on sound
economic fundamentals play the role of screening out insolvency and picking a pool of
countries in which the likelihood of solvency crises quite small.  These conditions, as
well as the private sector participation in our proposal, serve to control moral hazard.
The third reason why official last resort lending is desirable, even if there is the
risk of lending into insolvency, is simply that the alternatives are worse.  The realistic,
and possibly best, alternative is some version of rescue packages, the limitations and
inefficiencies of which are discussed above. While this lender-of-last-resort role may be
risky for IFIs, responding to crises with rescue packages is a costly and ineffective
alternative.  The merits of preventive operations are best judged when weighed against
this benchmark. Yet another initiative currently under experimentation is to make rescue
packages conditional on private sector burden sharing the burden in order to eliminate the
moral hazard that would be created by unconditional support.  In the next section, we
discuss this initiative and propose an alternative approach to traditional solvency crises.
International Financial Contagion Facility
Finally, the case of international financial contagion is also a key area for initiatives
involving official financial support.  This case is similar to that of liquidity crises in
critical dimensions.  First, recent experience shows that, like liquidity crises, international
financial contagion appears to be prevalent in this new era of international finance and is
in fact another distortion underlying the Theories of Too Volatile.  Second, from the point
of view of the country the basic problem is not weak fundamentals but lack of financing,
i.e., distorted risk spreads and lack of access to market.  Over time financial contagion
weakens fundamentals and may end up in a real (solvency) crisis. Third, financial
contagion can be treated with a purely financial solution: the provision of financing is
efficient and prevents the crisis.  In the case of contagion it works not because it removes
the panic equilibrium, but because it relaxes a temporary constraint distorting the normal
equilibrium.
                                                                                                                                           
problems can be detected in advance and are amenable to early action.  Otherwise there should be a strong
presumption that liquidity is the key issue.11
The above parallels justify a facility similar to lending of last resort, but one that
would allow countries affected by international financial contagion to counteract the
cumulative effect of the credit crunch and prevent a full-blown crisis.
6  Once again, the
risk is of financing a country with weak fundamentals that will fall into crisis even after
contagion ceases.  However, there is a large scope for accurately discriminating which
countries should be supported.  First, the widespread nature of contagion makes it quite
apparent when countries are victims of this phenomenon; non-systematic effects should
not be attributed to contagion.  Second, even distorted by contagion, relative market
indicators across countries, e.g., spreads, continue to reflect relative fundamentals and are
reliable pieces of information (see  Fernández-Arias and Rigobón, 1998).  An official
contagion facility should stand ready to support countries meeting the eligibility
conditions.  As before, participation of the private sector, discussed in the following
section, would be a desirable feature.
Private Sector Involvement
Private markets have thus far tried to insulate themselves from sovereign risk with
relatively rigid contracts, which lacked clauses that could be exploited to justify
nonpayment.  Yet a solution tailored to a willingness-to-pay problem may make crises
triggered by an ability-to-pay problem more difficult to manage and more costly.  It
usually makes debt workouts quite messy and unnecessarily extends the period during
which countries are cut off from international financial markets, a second problem
underlying the Theories of Too Little.  Hence, some authors have been proposing
mechanisms to make such workouts more orderly without worsening the sovereign risk
problem and without requiring the use of new public resources to take previously
exposed creditors off the hook (see Eichengreen and Portes, 1997 and Eichengreen 1999).
If flexible contingent contracts are best, why is it that we seldom see them in the
marketplace?  One answer to this question is that their virtue is not fully internalized at
the individual level, with the implication that a specific contingent contract offered would
be too expensive for the borrower to accept.  In a situation in which sovereign risk
imposes an aggregate cap to payments to creditors, flexibility in one contract would shift
payments to other contracts without contributing to flexibility in the aggregate.  Whatever
the reason for the market failure, it appears clear that any reform on this front will have to
provide for very tight coordination among creditors.  The mechanism for collective action
is likely to be fundamental in any initiative involving private sector involvement.
In this section we review three classes of initiatives.  The first class involves the
flexibilization of private debt contracts, whether by changing the economic structure of
the contracts to make them contingent or by softening the provisions relevant for
renegotiation.   The second class involves the international implementation of the
function of bankruptcy court, to which every private contract would be subject.   Finally,
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the 1998 $40 billion-plus Brazil package.12
we review a third class of initiatives in which the official and the private sector would
share financial support.
More Flexibility in Private Debt Contracts
There are two main types of proposals involving the incorporation of contractual
provisions in private debt contracts. One proposal includes an option in favor of the
debtor to reschedule payments at a premium (e.g., as explained by Buiter and Sybert
1999).  The other proposal would include collective action clauses and other loan
restructuring provisions in debt contracts that would facilitate renegotiation with
bondholders (e.g., as explained in Eichengreen, 1999 for bond contracts).
In both cases, debt restructuring is achieved bilaterally between debtor and
creditors, without the official sector intervening in any way.  In the first case, the debtor
obtains financing within the provisions of the contract (as opposed to according to a
bankruptcy law or other higher order framework).  In the second case, flexibility is
achieved with collective action loan restructuring provisions that facilitate contract
renegotiation (once again without the interference of the official sector), such as majority
voting, as opposed to unanimity, and sharing clauses, as opposed to collective
representation.
The basic argument behind these proposals is that debt contracts are too rigid and
make countries prone to crises: the creditors’ right not to rollover debt leads to either very
inefficient adjustments or, frequently, contract breaching with uncertain consequences.
Flexible contracts in which creditors can be forced to rollover debt under conditions in
which they would otherwise not like to provide financing, as in the first type of proposal,
can alleviate the costs of adjustment and, in the event of a potential liquidity crisis,
prevent the problem altogether.  Even if contracts are rigid, easy renegotiation, as in the
second proposal (flexible implicit contracts), can achieve a similar payment outcome and,
achieve the same objective.  This point is particularly important for bonds, whose typical
contract does not limit the suing rights of individual (or small sets of) bondholders and,
consequently, leads to rigidity (either full payment or full default).  The increasing
importance of securitization in the 1990s has brought this concern to the forefront.
Not surprisingly, the best case for making private debt contracts more flexible is
that of a liquidity crisis: the liquidity ensured by flexibility reduces or eliminates the
potential for such a crisis and, therefore, has advantages both ex post and ex ante.  The
problem arises when the crisis is not of liquidity and flexibility simply means that
creditors forego payments.  The main concern is that flexible payments (either in the
explicit contract or through renegotiation) may result in lower average payments,
exacerbating the sovereign risk distortion, in which case the flexibility proposals entail an
ex ante financial cost that may more than offset the ex-post advantage of flexibility.  In
particular, a key issue is the extent to which flexibility will be subject to abuse by the
debtor and used to the creditor’s disadvantage.13
The premium for exercising the rollover option in the recent proposal by Buiter
and Sybert is meant to control for opportunism, but it clearly has limited value because it
would only screen marginally bad risks: those who do not plan to pay will not be
discouraged by a premium.  Easier renegotiation appears to have an ambiguous effect on
expected payments: on the one hand, it may avoid complete default because it solves the
collective action problem preventing a settlement for a partial payment, but on the other
hand it allows the debtor to pay less than full payment by exercising the bargaining
power granted by the new provisions.  The balance is not clear: ex post, it is better to
have flexibility; but lack of flexibility may provide better terms ex ante.  This may
become a serious problem if there is room to opportunistically manipulate flexibility ex-
post.
The pro-renegotiation proposal makes bonds similar to loans.  It is interesting
how conventional wisdom is changing in this regard.  It was once widely believed that
too much flexibility to renegotiate bank debt during the 1980s debt crisis had spawned
endless renegotiations.  Now, in the face of a different kind of crisis, many analysts favor
the reintroduction of flexibility.
The above  favorable arguments assume that all debt contracts are somehow
modified  exogenously.  In practice, there are serious implementation issues in
coordinating collective actions of creditors.  First, if only one set of contracts is modified,
then it would become a second class of instruments, encumbered by options or right
limitations without any specific redeeming benefit.
7   In particular, if only future
contracts are treated, that would amount to adding adverse conditions to new financing, at
least during a transition period.   This comprehensiveness requirement extends to all
classes of contracts because otherwise those exempted would free ride and drive flexible
instruments out of the market, rendering the initiative ineffective; for example, if only
loans were modified, bonds would be at a relative advantage and would tend to dominate
the market.  Second, there are difficulties with each emerging country unilaterally
redesigning its contracts along these lines.  Just as a prenuptial agreement would, a
unilateral change might be interpreted negatively as a signal of lack of commitment.  A
more collective approach would provide governments and fiancées alike with cover
regarding their honourable intentions.  This would call for an international agreement on
loan restructuring provisions.
So the bottom line is that we find these initiatives interesting in their attempt to
make workouts more efficient but have serious doubts about their potential.  First, even
under ideal implementation, they are risky propositions because they may aggravate the
sovereign risk distortion.  Second, the collective action problems that need to be solved
for their successful implementation, especially the comprehensiveness of treatment across
instruments, appear quite severe.
8
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8 Furthermore, the evidence available on countries that issue renegotiation-friendly bonds under English
law does not support the notion that this kind of bond flexibilization would yield a significant advantage.14
International Bankruptcy Court
Another proposal is to create an international bankruptcy court, which would be modeled
on the equivalent domestic institution.  This court would authorize sovereigns not to
repay or to prevent domestic borrowers from repaying when the country is deemed
unable, rather than simply unwilling, to pay. This decision would stop legal action against
the borrower in member countries, thus reducing the transaction costs and creating a real
difference between unilateral sovereign action and an independent court decision.  By
transferring the power to authorize nonpayment to an independent court that does not
have a willingness-to-pay problem, this arrangement provides more flexibility while
keeping sovereign risk under control. Obviously the sovereign could still decide to
violate the decisions of the international court, but it would forgo the protection against
suit provided by the court. More importantly, it would allow those willing but eventually
unable to repay to pre-commit to a more credible arrangement. Since an independent
body will have declared the default to be “excusable” on the merits rather than a
unilateral decision by a sovereign, trustworthiness in future dealings would be enhanced.
One question about this initiative is whether it is possible to gather sufficient
political support from sovereigns to effectively empower the court.  It is clear that, unlike
a domestic bankruptcy court, the international version would not be able to replace
management.  It has also been argued that, realistically speaking, this court would not be
able to go beyond imposing a stay on payments, which the sovereigns can already
achieve by simply not paying.  Nevertheless, unilateral default carries penalties of many
kinds, explicit and implicit, private and official, as well as costly negotiations, which a
legally binding stay on payments would eliminate.
To some extent, this proposal duplicates some of the functions the International
Monetary Fund already performs.  When a country gets in trouble, the IMF determines
the amount of adjustment that is feasible or reasonable, calculates a financing gap, and
coordinates with official creditors and commercial banks a financial plan to make the
program consistent.  By deciding how much the country can pay, it differentiates between
ability and willingness to pay, thus solving the problem in a way similar to a bankruptcy
court.  However, there is a key difference in that rulings by the court would have a legal
bearing on creditors’ claims, who would not be able to press for payment if the country is
under bankruptcy protection.  As in domestic bankruptcy, legal protection should have a
major impact on the efficiency of the workout.
Like more flexible debt contracts, this initiative addresses the problem of
inefficient workouts, in this case by imposing order along the lines of traditional
bankruptcy law, and would automatically address liquidity crises.  All cross-border
contracts, no matter how rigid, in countries that are signatories of the international
bankruptcy court would become implicitly more flexible.  Importantly, this initiative goes
a long way toward solving the two main difficulties we saw in the previous class of
initiatives.  First, the comprehensiveness across instruments that is required is naturally
achieved by the court’s jurisdiction over all cross-border obligations, rather than
constructed transaction by transaction.  Second, it also provides a natural solution for the15
collective action of countries seeking to benefit from the initiative.  Therefore, we
support this initiative and favor it over the previous class of initiatives.
Official-Private Coordination
The initiatives reviewed above are not mutually exclusive and would in fact work better
in combination.  For example, it would be a good idea to implement official support
through lending of last resort and an international contagion facility with an international
bankruptcy court in place.  Still, the question arises whether there should be more active
coordination or interaction between the official and the private sectors, or in other words,
how should the official sector promote private sector involvement (PSI).  In this segment,
we first review some constructive means of facilitating PSI through voluntary means and
then discuss forced PSI, in which official support is made conditional on private burden
sharing.
In the previous section we mentioned two instances in which voluntary PSI was
useful in leveraging official support.  First, we noted that official lending of last resort
would be more effective if it were cofinanced by the private sector and that the failure to
address PSI in the Fund’s CCL was a weakness.  Private involvement in official last
resort lending would be important to ensure achieving critical mass to prevent crises and
also to ensure accountability through pricing and private country eligibility.  These
arrangements with the private sector have to be conducted in normal times when there is
a private interest to provide this kind of insurance to countries, and should be high on the
agenda once market conditions return to normal.
9
Second, PSI in an official international financial contagion facility would also be
quite useful in arriving at the kind of sums needed to effectively support countries.  It is
clear that financial enhancements are needed for the private sector to be willing to lend to
countries during the period of contagion.  The idea is therefore to provide official
enhancements sufficient to revive private interest in lending in such a way that leverage is
maximized.  For example, official enhancements may take the form of partial guarantees
of private credits, so that the risk mix becomes acceptable for private lending.
10
It is worth noting that the use of official enhancements to spark private lending is
a way of relaxing the sovereign risk constraint that private creditors face.  In fact, IFIs
face a much lower sovereign risk and may be able to leverage their lending by
transferring that lower risk to private parties.  The reason for their risk advantage is that
their policy requires them to suspend operations in countries that run into arrears.  Since
they are a cheap source of future credit and are committed to stop lending in case of
arrears, sovereigns have always repaid, giving these multilateral institutions their
preferred creditor status.  In a world where such binding devices are scarce, questions
                                               
9 Argentina and Mexico secured private credit lines of this kind before the crisis.  The IFIs recently
supported the extension of Argentina’s program in the middle of financial contagion, another good example
of official-private coordination.
10 The World Bank recently extended a partial guarantee that allowed Argentina to obtain investment grade,
three notches above its regular rating.16
have been raised about whether these institutions are making adequate use of their
commitment technology.  In the context of countries lacking access to private financial
markets, there is no question that the official sector can be very effective in alleviating
this distortion.
Therefore, we strongly support voluntary PSI in the context of official support
facilities, both arranged at normal times at market terms and arranged at emergency times
with financial enhancements.  However, we think that forced PSI, which appears to be
the basis of a new doctrine on official sector policy, can very easily become counter-
productive unless it is done in a manner more similar to either a bankruptcy process or a
Brady plan. In the rest of the section we review this case.
For reasons that we argue below, forced PSI is likely to be very costly and should
only be considered in the extreme cases in which domestic adjustment and official
international support are deemed insufficient to reestablish confidence. If confidence is
not reestablished, official money will be quite unproductive, as the private sector would
exploit the opportunity to bail out of the country. But forced PSI should not be used as a
way to teach a lesson to the private sector and thus reduce moral hazard because it is
likely to have very large social costs. Moreover, the number of cases that would qualify is
not independent of the supply of official funding. In general, the traditional approach of
domestic adjustment and official support, with the private sector coming back on its own,
is superior and should not limited by a stingier approach to official international
involvement.
There are at least two distinct reasons why the traditional approach would not
work. One is a remaining liquidity problem, and the other is solvency. The liquidity
problem can arise because, even if the domestic adjustment and the official support are
sufficient to reestablish solvency, the private sector may face a multiple equilibria
situation in which the decision to stay or leave depends on what each investor thinks
others might do. To ease this problem the IMF has recently used “moral suasion” or
cajoling (e.g., veiled pressure on banks to refinance or maintain credit lines in Korea and
Brazil) as a coordinating device.
Another case emerges when the concern over solvency is such that the traditional
approach is perceived as inadequate because the country is unable to sustain its current
debt level, and hence additional money per se is unlikely to reestablish confidence. Here,
debt reduction may need to form part of the solution. Mechanisms to address these cases
are now under experimentation. These include renegotiation with private bondholders as
a prior condition for Paris Club rescheduling (e.g., “comparable treatment” requirement
in Pakistan) or IMF support (e.g., default of Brady bonds in Ecuador).
Obviously, in a crisis any financial room for maneuver is very valuable.
However, the disastrous experience of Ecuador should teach us some important lessons
about the perils involved. First, the official international sector should not lose sight of its
fundamental coordinating role during crises. To request private sector involvement as a
prior action before the official sector commits itself puts the cart before the horse. It17
demands the private sector to participate in a still non-existing program, thus reducing the
informational content of the situation. Secondly, the delay involved in waiting for a
private sector response may involve a dramatic deterioration of domestic economic
conditions as economic activity collapses, aggravating fiscal and financial imbalances
and further undermining confidence. Finally, the whole notion of comparative treatment
may be the wrong paradigm. After all, during the last “orderly workout” that Latin
America went through, i.e., the Brady plan, the roles of public and private sector were
quite different. The public sector put additional resources toward generating the
enhancements that allowed for private sector debt reduction.
If forced burden sharing becomes part of the “implicit contract,” it will have an
effect on the cost of capital.  This need not be a bad trade-off if the conditions for burden
sharing are clear and not subject to abuse; in that case, they would define a standard of
“excusable default” that would ensure flexibility when needed. An international
bankruptcy court would fit this characterization.  In that case, under insolvency
conditions  PSI would kick in according to international law, coordinated and
supplemented by official support.
11  The efficiency of this workout mechanism is likely
to lead to lower financial costs, rather than higher.
However, the case-by-case, secretive approach with weak coordination that has
been followed so far makes this proposition doubtful. In this case financial costs will
increase.  Perhaps more importantly, if forced PSI is used for anything other than extreme
cases, it will end up being a destabilizing and worsening move. Up to now, if an economy
got into trouble, the willingness of the government to call for an IMF agreement was seen
as a way to signal its disposition to adjust and thus was a means to reestablish confidence.
Under forced PSI, the private sector would take such an announcement as one reason to
try to get out of the country before a stay or a debt reduction is forced upon it. This would
aggravate the situation and provide less liquidity and opportunity to get the needed
adjustments done in time. Under these conditions, governments will be less willing to call
on the IMF for assistance.
In synthesis, forced private burden sharing should be a very exceptional situation.
It should only be used for cases in which the level of debt is seen as unsustainable. But
the current push, designed to use burden sharing as a way to teach the private sector a
lesson, is quite unhelpful. After all, if Ecuador has become insolvent again, in spite of the
analyses that led to its last debt reduction during its Brady plan of 1994, it is not because
of moral hazard. Instead, it is because of a sequence of massive real shocks such as El
Niño, the decline in oil and other commodity prices and the volatility in international
capital flows. Under these conditions, it became impossible to reach domestic political
consensus before substantial additional damage was done to the fundamentals.
Hence, to engage in forced private sector involvement as a way to limit moral
hazard is the wrong approach. Instead, more forceful and faster official intervention and a
clearer offically sponsored private debt reduction is critical. The world cannot afford
                                               
11 At the same time, the country ought to adjust and reform.  Ideally, the balance between private and
official support would depend on how prudent the country’s policies are.18
another case of a country that is forced to default on the private sector as one more
condition to reach an IMF agreement and then is left to linger on without any official
support.
More generally, making official involvement conditional on PSI implies that
official support is not provided or, in the best case, that it is delayed.  It is key to
recognize that this implication entails a very substantial foregone benefit, and therefore a
very substantial cost to these moral hazard-based initiatives.  If applied to cases other
than those of true insolvency the results would be disastrous. Given the prevalence of
liquidity crises and financial contagion, the availability of official support is likely to be
quite beneficial despite moral hazard.  Moreover, the difficulty in stopping a crisis once it
starts argues in favor of speed, not of convoluted and slow coordination with hundreds of
anonymous bondholders. Even if support is finally provided, a delay in the provision of
official support greatly complicates crisis prevention.  Furthermore, delay is quite
detrimental, even in the context of a non-preventive rescue strategy.
The conclusion is that the broad application of these initiatives as the basis for
official intervention would have serious adverse side effects on financial integration and
market volatility.  Furthermore, in our view the importance of moral hazard is grossly
exaggerated relative to other distortions in the international financial markets that
emerging countries face.  Most of the workout coordination can be obtained by other
means without risking delays.  Therefore, we do not favor the initiatives based on the
doctrine of (forced) PSI to control moral hazard and consider it a last resort in
exceptional cases.
Financial Institutional Framework
In this section we review initiatives that address the institutional framework in which
capital flows take place.  They include the financial standards and regulations in financial
systems, both national and international.  We also address the issue of monetary and
currency arrangements in emerging countries, a key area within international financial
architecture which has received surprisingly little attention so far.
Recent crises have uncovered widespread weaknesses in financial systems and
have prompted the elaboration of financial standards and regulations to strengthen them.
It is interesting to notice that the emphasis on the kind of fixing that needs to be done
directly depends on which class of distortions is deemed to be more substantial.
Those who think that moral hazard is the main problem emphasize the
strengthening of the solvency of financial institutions to make sure that they do not play
with other people’s money.  The main initiative in this field has to do with capital
adequacy requirements for banks in the domestic system and strong supervision to ensure
that they are enforced.  Basle risk weights for bank lending are also being reformed along
the same lines, ensuring that lending to higher risk countries faces a higher regulatory
cost.19
This agenda has moved forward very quickly in Latin America, especially after
the Tequila crisis, and is behind the resilience of the region’s banking systems  in
withstanding recent financial turmoil and the deep 1998-99 recession. In fact, most Latin
American countries have capital adequacy requirements that are above the Basle
standards and supervisory systems have been thoroughly reformed. While this has made
banks stronger, it has not translated into more stable flows of international capital. Hence,
while these policies are quite uncontroversial in the region, it is unclear that they do much
to limit international financial turmoil.
There is also the question of how to measure risk to determine Basle weights in
industrial countries for cross-border lending.  One idea that has been floated is to use the
ratings of credit rating agencies for this purpose. As proposed at present, the new
initiative would increase the cost of capital for all Latin American countries except Chile.
This in itself would aggravate the dearth of capital flows to emerging markets and
increase the distortions associated with sovereign risk. Moreover, to the extent that
ratings follow market developments, it appears that this method will introduce further
instability in the market and may, in the extreme, cause self-fulfilling panic crises.  This
idea appears ill-conceived.
The initiatives inspired in the Theories of Too Little focus on how to improve the
commitment to repay.  Those include issues such as the clear definition of property
rights, the legal ability to attach collateral, the efficiency of the judicial system to enforce
contracts, the efficiency of domestic bankruptcy law, and the existence of credible credit
bureaus.  We believe that these areas are not receiving all the attention they deserve.
They all would lead to more finance and growth and impose no tradeoffs.
By contrast, new initiatives to reduce mismatches through regulatory schemes
impose a more serious tradeoff between growth and stability. The crises in East Asian
have made the magnitude of currency and maturity mismatches much more visible and
raised new regulatory concerns. Some have argued in favor of stricter regulation of these
mismatches. Others (Krueger, 1999) have proposed taxing foreign currency borrowing.
Our main concern is that these mismatches are the consequence of original sin, i.e., the
inability to borrow abroad in domestic currency and the inability to borrow long term,
even domestically, in domestic currency. If mismatches are restricted without solving the
original sin problem, it will lead to a drastic reduction of financial intermediation, both
domestic and cross-border. We view this as justifying a different approach to currency
arrangements.
Finally, those who focus on the Theories of Too Volatile emphasize initiatives
that protect the financial systems against sudden changes in market sentiment.  One class
of initiatives is aimed at strengthening the liquidity of the banking system by setting high
liquidity requirements.   It is interesting to note that the most prudent Latin American
governments have found it useful to have a liquidity policy, while the OECD has
explicitly eliminated liquidity requirements from its regulatory scheme. Hence, high
liquidity requirements must be seen as a second best, given the presence of some other
distortion that is much more prevalent in emerging markets. We believe that two20
problems are involved here. The first is original sin, which makes currency and maturity
mismatches take on a more important role while limiting the central bank’s ability to use
fiat money to backstop the system (given the presence of net dollar liabilities). The
second is the general illiquidity in asset markets which severely limits the universe of
assets which can be used as sources of secondary liquidity.
In our view, the imposition of high liquidity requirements on the banking system
is a useful initiative, but it is important to allow these liquidity reserves to be remunerated
in order to minimize the increase in the cost of capital and the reduction in financial
intermediation.
The other side of the coin of high liquidity requirements on banks is an emphasis
on large international reserves, especially in relation to short-term obligations.  To the
extent that liquidity concerns are prevalent in recent experience, policies aimed at
delivering high reserves and discouraging short-term debt make sense.  At the same time,
these policies have the drawback of imposing higher costs of capital and reducing the
domestic absorption of foreign savings.  We must recognize that at present reserve levels
relative to M2 are about ten times larger in Latin America than in the typical industrial
country. This radical difference must also reflect the presence of a fundamental
difference in economic structure. Holding reserves makes sense if there are states of the
world in which a country cannot access the international capital markets.  For example,
by being sufficiently liquid a country can avoid falling into the kind of self-fulfilling
liquidity crisis that is associated with rolling over the foreign debt. This is the
consequence of distortions other than moral hazard and is unlikely to be addressed by any
of the initiatives to curb moral hazard that are on the table.
It is important to recognize that these kinds of prudential policies are second best.
For example, while in Australia international reserves are about 5% of M2, they average
over 35% of M2 in Latin America. Also, while the short-term debt of Australia represents
50% of the total foreign debt and about five times the level of international reserves, in
Latin America reserves cover 107% of short-term debt. Clearly, Latin American
countries are concerned about avoiding situations that do not seem to arise in Australia.
One explanation is that Australia does not suffer from original sin and hence can borrow
abroad in its own currency. This means that the Central Bank can act as lender of last
resort because it can provide liquidity through fiat money to a critical mass of the foreign
debt, and it does not need international reserves to do this. Hence, liquidity problems may
be very much related to currencies that suffer from original sin. Interestingly, the country
in Latin America with by far the lowest level of international reserves is Panama, the only
dollarized country. Here it is interesting to note that the banking system does not fear
periods of illiquidity in spite of the absence of a Central Bank. Its integration to the
international system and the absence of original sin does away with the liquidity problem,
even in a country that has a relatively low credit rating.
In this sense, the mechanisms of international last resort lending or a contagion
facility can be viewed as another and superior way of addressing issues of liquidity since
they involve not self-insurance, but actual insurance.21
The question of how to implement financial standards and regulations in
emerging countries is open to debate.  Specifically, if recommended standards and
regulations are not adopted by countries once advised to do so, how far should
international organizations go in encouraging their implementation and enforcement?
For example, it has been proposed that IMF and other IFIs include compliance with
standards in their conditionality, in the pricing of their loans or as a factor relevant for
eligibility in selective facilities (e.g., CCL).  In the same vein, compliance could also be a
factor in Basle weights or other international regulations.  Given our degree of ignorance
about the merits of different models of financial organization for development, e.g., the
five Asian tigers suddenly became five basket cases and are now recovering strongly in
the course of a few quarters, it pays to be cautious in the implementation of global
guidelines.  As argued by Rodrik (1999), there are too many development puzzles and too
many different and unique roads to success to warrant the imposition of a globally
standardized approach
Finally, there is the important issue of how to reform financial regulations in
developed countries in order to prevent problems that may affect emerging markets.  A
case in point is international financial contagion, whose main transmission mechanism, if
not root cause, resides in how financial intermediation to emerging markets operates.
Two main problems have been identified in recent experience.  The first is the likelihood
that financial intermediaries become over-leveraged as a result of market losses and are
forced to sell off their positions.  The second is the dependency of emerging markets on a
select group of specialist financial institutions, which makes the market for paper quite
illiquid.  These problems lead to fire-sale prices in times of trouble and the collapse of the
market.
The main initiative on the table to address these concerns is the tightening of
regulation to discourage high leverage, which would therefore make over-leverage less
likely.  We are concerned that, as in the case of other initiatives on the table, this one
seeks financial stability by simply reducing capital flows to emerging markets, thus
aggravating one of the important distortions to be fixed.  In our view, it would be
preferable to focus reforms in other directions.  For example, regulatory forbearance to be
activated in the case of a systemic shock like international financial contagion would help
to diffuse the sudden jolt that over-leverage causes. In this sense, marking to market
makes illiquid markets even more unstable when the asset price collapse is not based on
fundamentals.  Regulatory flexibility under these contingencies, in order to impede the
cascading collapse, would be an effective circuit breaker under “peak” times, preferable
to reducing flow levels on a permanent basis.
Much more promising would be a relaxation of the regulations that prohibit
important institutional investor from buying non-investment grade paper. This  may
represent a radical change in the structure of emerging markets, which have become
overly dependent on a small set of specialized investors. Allowing institutional investors
to hold a very small fraction of their portfolio in non-investment grade emerging country
paper (say 1 percent) instead of the current prohibition would have a negligible impact on22
portfolio risk but would be very helpful in providing stability and liquidity to the market.
It would also permit higher flows and reduce the collapse during contagion episodes.
Conclusion
Most current initiatives for reforming the international financial architecture are guided
by two principles: a) constrain official financial support in order to avoid bailing out the
private sector and creating moral hazard; and b) increase stability in financial markets by
limiting capital flows to emerging markets.  We find these principles unsatisfactory as a
basis for a solution to the problems of international finance for development and propose
alternative solutions.  Even more, we fear that current initiatives may be developmentally
counterproductive once their negative effects on the level of capital flows and growth are
factored in.
Ours is a Latin American assessment of the initiatives, and therefore not a neutral
viewpoint.  In order to clarify the debate it is important to recognize that reforms to the
international financial architecture have asymmetric effects for the parties involved.  In
particular, reforms that support deeper financial integration and faster growth in the
region may also be more costly to industrial countries in terms of financial risks when
disruptions occur.  The above principles minimize the financial costs of international
cooperation, which may reflect the fact that the efficient integration of emerging markets
may be too costly for industrial countries.
We have argued in favor of new institutions to address liquidity and contagion
problems. We have expressed support for the idea of an international bankruptcy court.
We find value in improving financial regulation and supervision but think that the greater
additional pay-off in Latin America is related to the improvement of institutions that
solve commitment problems and manage liquidity risks.
We also find that many of the origins of liquidity crises and problems of financial
fragility are caused by original sin, i.e., the fact that the national currency cannot be used
to borrow abroad or even domestically to borrow long term. This creates the mismatches
that can easily come home to roost at the first sign of trouble. It also limits the ability of
central banks to backstop the market unless they hold enormous amounts of international
reserves. This calls into question the monetary architecture of the world. Can a world of
over 100 currencies achieve financial integration? This question is left for a companion
paper (Hausmann, 1999).
Debate about the new financial architecture is spurred by dissatisfaction with the
world as we find it.  Financial turmoil is exacting enormous social costs in all emerging
market countries.  Contagion has made the problem more difficult and costly to address
through the exercise of national virtue.  It has transformed localized infections into an
international disease that needs an international cure.
How much of current social suffering is attributable to an inadequate financial
architecture is an open question.  But it is clear that the costs of this inadequacy are borne23
mostly by emerging countries, while any decisions on how to change international
institutions and their financial backing inevitably involve the industrial countries.  One is
reminded of Ortega y Gasset’s remark that the pain of others is so much easier to bear
than one’s own.24
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